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Introduction
Terrorism has become a real security threat for nearly every country in the world. Despite of
the declaration and adoption of several procedures to fight terrorism and its perpetrators,
countries have not yet succeeded to control the huge numbers of recruits being mobilized by
terrorist organizations.1 The literature has covered several factors that make recruits vulnerable
and easily mobilized and radicalized by terrorist organizations, among which is the suppression
of civil and political rights in non-democratic countries, as well as weak political institutions.2
Among the Arab world countries, it has been puzzling to find out that despite of being the sole
democratizing Arab country, Tunisia has been found to generate the greatest number of foreign
fighters joining jihadist groups.3 At the same time, the country’s main Islamist party, Ennahda,
decided to back up the new democratic government after the Arab Spring, accept a constitution
that contradicts the party’s Islamist ideology, and be part of the democratization process in
Tunisia.4 Not only that, but also, Ennahda party was able to win the elections of the Constituent

1

Almakan Orozobekova, "The Mobilization and Recruitment of Foreign Fighters: The Case

of Islamic State, 2012–2014." Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and
Security Studies Institutes 15, no. 3 (2016): 83-100, p. 83.
2

Geoffrey Macdonald, and Luke Waggoner, "Dashed Hopes and Extremism in Tunisia."

Journal of Democracy 29, no. 1 (2018): 126-140, p. 126.
3

Meirav Mishali-Ram, "Foreign Fighters and Transnational Jihad in Syria." Studies in Conflict

& Terrorism 41, no. 3 (2018): 169-190, p. 170.; Ric Neo, "The Jihad post-Arab Spring:
Contextualising Islamic radicalism in Egypt and Tunisia." African Security Review 28, no. 2
(2019): 95-109, p. 100.
4

Fabio Merone, "Between social contention and takfirism: the evolution of the Salafi-jihadi

movement in Tunisia." Mediterranean Politics 22, no. 1 (2017): 71–90, p. 81.; Geoffrey
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Assembly with a momentous margin, as the party won 89 seats out of a total of 217 seats.5
Therefore, Tunisia has been a battle ground for these two competing mechanisms; the issue
which poses an empirical puzzle for this thesis. Hence, the main research question of this thesis
would be: why has the democratic transition in Tunisia been associated with a high rate of
recruits joining terrorist organizations? Whereas an extensive number of scholars argue that
democracy deters the emergence of terrorism, others view democracy and the transition to
democracy as a risky variable that could result in terrorist attacks and Islamic violence.6 The
driving force behind this question is to problematize the arguments against democratization
which claim that the transition to democracy results in Islamist terrorism, conflict, war, and
violence. Hence, this thesis aims to examine whether Islamist terrorism has roots and causes
stemming from the democratization process or not.
In order to answer this question, I hypothesize that democratization is not a dangerous
form of regime change since in Tunisia, interstate violence that resulted from Islamist groups
had already existed prior to the country’s transition to democracy. I argue that there is a
different and deeper explanation to the phenomenon beyond correlation between Islamist

Macdonald, and Luke Waggoner, "Dashed Hopes and Extremism in Tunisia." Journal of
Democracy (Johns Hopkins University Press) 29, no. 1 (2018): 126-140, p. 126.
5

Ahmad Najib Burhani, "The Reformasi ’98 and the Arab Spring: A Comparative Study of

Popular Uprisings in Indonesia and Tunisia." Asian Politics & Policy (Wiley Periodicals, Inc.)
6, no. 2 (2014): 199-215, p. 199.
6

Katerina Dalacoura, "Terrorism, Democracy and Islamist Terrorism." In Islamist Terrorism

and Democracy in the Middle East, (2011): 21-39, p. 23. Cambridge University Press.
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terrorism and democratization and I will emphasize the multiple and sometimes competing
mechanisms leading to these outcomes while resorting to Jon Elster’s mechanistic explanation.
This thesis aims to address the research puzzle at a multi-level analysis in order to find
if there is a casual narrative that explains this phenomenon. Hence, the multi-level synthesis
would address the micro-individual level and the macro-state level. Regarding the microindividual level, and in order to understand the tension in democratizing Tunisia, it is crucial
to examine how the previous studies on the factors affecting recruitment impact the high rate
of flow of recruits from Tunisia and to examine the motivations that push recruits in Tunisia to
join Islamist violent groups as ISIS. Hence, I will be drawing on constructivist tradition from
International Relations theory in which the unit of analysis goes beyond state actors and heads
into comparative politics and sociology that would help in analyzing how or why people get
recruited is. In order to understand the interaction between the political (the state) and Islamist
violent groups, constructivist tradition and transformative learning theory would be crucial to
understand the change in interests and identity of both state and non-state actors.7 In order to
tackle the research puzzle at a macro-state level, I will resort to democratization theory based
on the insights produced by Mansfield and Snyder, in “Electing to Fight: why emerging
democracies go to war”, in their attempt to link democracy and religion.8 Regarding the
research design and the methodology that will be used for the aim of the thesis, I will rely on
secondary sources to map the historical background of Islamism in Tunisia, and to understand
the relationship between democratization and Islamist violent acts.

7

Janani Krishnaswamy, "How Does Terrorism Lend Itself to Constructivist Understanding?"

E-International Relations Students (2012).
8

Edward D. Mansfield, and Jack Snyder, Electing To Fight: why emerging democracies go to

war. Cambridge: MIT Press, (2005): 1-285.
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After analyzing the research puzzle from a micro-individual level and macro-state level
perspectives, I will come up with a meso-level of analysis that would explain that
democratization is not the crucial variable to the rise of violence in Tunisia. Therefore, in order
to understand the stance of Ennahda party versus those who joined violent and terrorist groups
amid the Arab Spring revolution and during the democratization process in Tunisia, I will resort
to Jon Elster’s mechanisms and rely on the secondary sources in this regard to explain the
thesis’s puzzle. Hence, the micro-individual analysis of the motivations that push individuals
in Tunisia to join Islamist violent groups along with the macro-state analysis of the country’s
institutions and historical background of Islamism in Tunisia would both result in a meso-level
analysis of the thesis’s research puzzle which will be thoroughly explicated using Jon Elster’s
mechanistic explanation.
Regarding the case study of this thesis, the main focus will be on Tunisia for its unique
aspects among the Arab countries and for being a battle ground for the puzzling issue of being
the only democratizing Arab country and the largest generator of violent Islamist individuals.
The reason behind using a single case study method is to study the case in-depth and intensively
with the aim of understanding a wider range of relatively similar cases.9 Using a case study for
the aim of this thesis will provide an implicit comparison for other cases as well, which would
thus be useful for other research purposes.10 Since the aim of this thesis is mainly to examine
whether there is a casual relationship between Tunisia’s democratization and the high rate of

9

John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?" The American Political

Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004): 341-354, p. 342.
10

Ibid., 348.
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recruits, therefore, using a case study method will allow for peering into “the box of causality
to the intermediate causes lying between some causes” and its asserted effect.11
In this thesis, for the sake of clarity and consistency, I will be using the term ‘Islamists’
violence’ to refer to any acts of violence that have been carried out by those affiliated to any
of the jihadist groups or those who claim to fight for their optimal goal of having an Islamic
State. Although the use of violence by the government against its citizens could be referred to
as terrorism by broadening the definition, in this thesis, the use of the term “terrorism” limitedly
and precisely refers to the deployment of violent acts by a group or an organization, and not by
the government, in order to spread fear and intimidation and achieve specific goals. I decline
from using the broader definition in order to not distract the attention from the thesis’s main
focus. Hence, the term “terrorism” in this thesis refers to political act carried out by an
organized group that involves the intention of killing, harming, or destroying state’s vital
institutions and to spread fear among both civilians, noncombatants, and the regime.12 Last but
not least, for the purpose of this thesis, the use of the term Jihadists refers to radical Islamists.13
The thesis is divided into three sections: chapter one, chapter two, and chapter three
which is the conclusion. In chapter one, I mainly discuss the historical background of Islamism
in Tunisia in an effort to prove that Islamists’ violence existed even before Tunisia’s transition
to democracy. Hence, chapter one will be a detailed presentation and analysis of the initiation
of Islamism in Tunisia as well as the incidence of violent actions carried out by Islamist groups
prior to the Arab Spring and under the Tunisian authoritarian regimes. The aim of this chapter
is to examine whether Islamist violence occurred only during the democratization process in

11

Ibid., 348.

12

Dalacoura. "Introduction: The Book’s Central Question and Rationale.", 13.

13

Merone, "Between social contention and takfirism”, 72.
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Tunisia or it existed prior to the democratization process. Chapter two will then examine the
Islamists’ different reactions to the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia, where the country was
regarded as a battle ground for two competing mechanisms. The first of which is the large
number of individuals joining Islamist violent actions and groups, and the second one is the
decision of the country’s main Islamist party, Ennahda, to give up some of its core principles,
accept the democratic transition, and be part of the new secular government. The aim of the
chapter is to argue that democratization is not a crucial variable for Islamists’ violence, and to
come up with a meso-level analysis which combines the micro-individual and macro-state
analysis. This meso-level analysis of the thesis’s puzzle would then be thoroughly explained
through Jon Elster’s mechanisms in chapter two. Chapter three is the last part of this thesis in
which I explain the relationship between democratization, Islamists’ violence, and compromise
while resorting to the approach of mechanisms.
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Chapter 1: Islamism in Tunisia
Introduction
A common narrative among authoritarians associate terrorist attacks carried out by jihadists to
the overthrew of Ben Ali’s regime and the spread of instability due to the strong relationship
between the toppled regime and the country’s security apparatus.14 The rest of authoritarian
rulers in the region adopted this narrative to show themselves as the safeguards of their
countries from Islamist violence and jihadism.15 This counter-revolutionary narrative’s flaw
lies in the absence of historical outlook.16 This chapter aims at deploying the process-tracing
method to trace the historical processes that may have an influence on the breakdown of the
regime rather than the revolution. After reviewing the literature, most scholars argue that
Islamic violence result from political instability and revolutions. Moreover, as discussed by
several scholars, including Mansfield and Snyder’s argument in their book “Electing to fight:
why emerging democracies go to war” in which they focus on the possibility of the emergence
of war and conflict during the transition to democracy, the authors argue that democratic
transitions are not necessarily dangerous, and war and conflicts arise during transition to
democracy in states that have weak or absent accountable political institutions, lack rule of
law, have no competitive political parties, and news media that is unprofessional and biased.17
However, after resorting to the process-tracing method and going through the history of

14

Jean-Pierre Filiu, "Jihadism in North Africa: A House of Many Mansions." Adelphi Series

55, no. 452 (2015): 97-112, p. 97.
15

Ibid.,

16

Ibid.,

17

Edward D. Mansfield, and Jack Snyder, Electing To Fight: why emerging democracies go

to war. Cambridge: MIT Press, (2005): 1-285, p. 2.
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Tunisia, I argue that democratization does not necessarily lead to violence since Islamic
violence existed prior to the Arab Spring and democratization process in Tunisia. Hence, the
aim of this chapter is to trace the history of Islamists’ violence in Tunisia prior to the revolution
of 2011, in order to understand whether if revolutions or uprisings lead to Islamic violence,
and then to assess the validity of Mansfield and Snyder’s argument and understand whether
political transition leads to Islamic violence or not, in order to prove that democratization is
not the crucial variable to the rise of violence and extremism in Tunisia, and that Islamists’
violence existed prior to the Arab Spring and the Tunisian transition to democracy.

Background on the origin of the term “Islamism”
Back in the late 1970s, the term “Islamism” was invented by French political scientists in an
effort to comprehend instances of Islamic activism such as the Iranian revolution.18 Back then,
the academic term “Islamist” was not used in reference to Islamist movements like the Tunisian
Islamist party, but “Muslim” was used instead. The Western media popularized the term
“Islamist”, which has been taken by some political actors influenced by Islamic divine ideas
such as Ennahda party, which “currently refers to itself as an Islamist party.”19 Islamism entails
the ideology that was originated by Jamal El-Din Al-Afghani and Hassan al-Banna back in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.20 Hence, the term “Islamism” identifies political actors that
have been influenced by this tradition and ideology such as the Muslim Brotherhood along
with its several sister parties across the Muslim and Arab world.21

18

Kasper Ly Netterstrøm, "After the Arab Spring: The Islamists’ Compromise in Tunisia."

Journal of Democracy 26, no. 4 (2015): 110-124, p. 111.
19

Ibid.,

20

Ibid.,

21

Ibid.,
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Islamism is mainly about perceiving Islam as a political ideology, and not only as a
religion, and the idea that the primary Islamic texts should organize and guide all the societal
aspects.22 Islamists believe that there is Islamic educational system, Islamic economy, as well
as environmental and social policies. Islamists, and mainly the Muslim Brotherhood, adopt the
slogan of “Islam is the solution”, which indicates that the solution for any political, societal, or
economic issue can be interpreted and solved based on the Islamic teachings, the Quran, and
the practices of the caliphs.23 Accordingly, Islamism is an ideology that aims to transform the
society based on a set of preidentified principles.24 Scholars perceive these Islamist parties and
movements differently. For instance, neoconservatives and orientalists believe that Islamist
movements and parties are undemocratic and uncapable of reforming.25 According to Bernard
Lewis, “For Islamists, democracy . . . is a one-way road on which there is no return, no rejection
of the sovereignty of God, as exercised through His chosen representatives.”26 Therefore,
scholars mostly agree that political actors who are influenced by Islamism are undemocratic
and uncapable of reforming.

Historical background: The initiation of Islamism in Tunisia
The recounting of the history of Islamist violence in Tunisia aims to show that although Tunisia
was ruled by authoritarian regimes that repressed and oppressed Islamists’ activities, and
marginalized them from the political scene for a long period of time, Tunisia still witnessed
Islamist violence and terrorist incidents throughout its history, and not only after its

22

Ibid.,

23

Ibid.,

24

Ibid., 112.

25

Ibid.,

26

Ibid.,
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democratization process after the Arab Spring. Tunisia’s Islamic nature and dynamics have
been linked to the country’s past religious and westernized policies.27 After Tunisia’s
independence in 1956 from France, President Habib Bourguiba was keen to develop an
exclusive “Tunisian Islam” in an effort to harmonize “religion with modernization”.28 Hence,
Bourguiba carried out a series of reforms with a sense of Westernism, which included the
launch of modernized educational system and the issuance of laws enhancing the rights of
women under “Tunisia’s Personal Status Code”.29 In order to fully implement the campaign of
modernization to Tunisia, Bourguiba worked on eradicating anything linked with “religious
conservatism”.30 This act was reflected in the dismantling of Islamic institutions such as
Zaytouna University, where education and religious teaching were characterized with
backwardness.31 Rachid Ghannouchi, co-founder of Ennahda Party, once stated that Bourguiba
carried out extensive changes to abolish the Tunisian “Arab-Muslim identity” and enforce the
model of the French life.32 Therefore, this period was characterized by the marginalization of
Islamists not only at a political level but also at a socio-economic level. As discussed
throughout the thesis, such factors can play as push factors encouraging individuals to join
terrorist groups in order to achieve their goals and attain their needs, and sometimes revenge
from the government.

27

Anne Wolf, "An Islamist ‘renaissance’? Religion and politics in post-revolutionary Tunisia."

The Journal of North African Studies 18, no. 4 (2013): 560-573, no. 561.
28

Ibid.,

29

Ibid.,

30

Ibid.,

31

Ibid.,

32

Ibid.,
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During a decade highlighted by clashes between the conservative and liberal wings,
and the political and institutional instability within the regime, the Islamic movement that
persists till today came to life in Tunisia during the 1970s as a result of internal and external
factors.33 From 1957 to 1987 under the ruling period of the first Tunisian president Habib
Bourguiba, some major clashes occurred. These series of crises were initiated in the 1950s by
the Youssefist crisis which was the moniker marking the bloody conflict and hostilities
between the supporters of the two focal leaders of the Neo-Destur Party; Habib Bourguiba and
Saleh Ben Youssef.34 Victims were left out of these clashes in Tunisia, including prosecuting
Ben Youssef’s supporters.35 The following clash was between the regime of Bourguiba and the
far leftists. The regime started forbidding the Communists from participating in the political
life in the 1960s. The clash came to an end when the liberals left the government and the ruling
party, while leaving grievances behind.36 During a decade highlighted by clashes between the
conservative and liberal wings, and the political and institutional instability within the regime,
the Islamic movement that persists till today came to life in Tunisia during the 1970s as a result
of internal and external factors.37 Internal factors were represented in the bloody confrontations

33

Ibid.; Ignatius Kobbina Yankey, "The Arab Spring in The Arab World: Is Islamism a Factor?

A Case Study of Tunisia." Journal of Social Science Research 12, no. 2 (2018): 2819-2827, p.
2822.
34

Alaya Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation: 1980-

2008.”, The Journal of North African Studies 14, no. 2 (2009): 257-272, p. 259.
35

Ibid.,

36

Ibid.,

37

Ibid.; Ignatius Kobbina Yankey, "The Arab Spring in The Arab World: Is Islamism a Factor?

A Case Study of Tunisia." Journal of Social Science Research 12, no. 2 (2018): 2819-2827, p.
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that continued after Bourguiba was announced “President for Life” in 1974 and the absence of
democracy in Bourguiba’s government dominated the scene.38 Clashes between the
government and the national trade union organization (U.G.T.T.) took place in 1978, leading
to causalities and the arrest and prosecution of a number of unionists.39 The Islamic Movement
started to take its first steps after these circumstances, with the issuance of Al-Maarifa
magazine.40 The aim of Al-Maarifa magazine was at first to focus on spreading principles of
Islam in mosques, promoting organizations to defend the Qur’an, along with religious and
societal issues as education and family topics. At first, Al-Maarifa magazine did not aim to
tackle political issues until the bloody conflict took place in 1978 after which Al-Maarifa
magazine started shifting its direction and topics to politics, backing the government against
the labor union’s leftists, and considering them as the Islamist movement’s enemy.41
The Islamic movement got promoted via external factors as well during the 1970s.42
The fading of the Arab nationalism as well as the Iranian revolution in 1979 fed the Tunisian
Islamic movement with organizational, political, and ideological sustenance. The Islamic
movement seemed to have supported the revolutionary tendency of Islam represented in the
Iranian revolution, and praised the revolution, considering it as a victory for Islam.43 Hence,
the Tunisian Islamist Movement flourished in light of the conflict between the rightists and

2822.
38

Alaya Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation, 259.

39

Ibid.,

40

Ibid.,

41

Ibid.,

42

Ibid.,

43

Ibid.,
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leftists.44 The principles of the Muslim Brotherhood influenced the goals of the Tunisian
Islamist Movement and some of their newspaper articles stressed the Movement’s refusal to
the views of the West.45 During the early 1980s, there was a remarkable change in the
Movement’s attitude, especially during the immigration period. At first, the Movement’s texts
criticized the West, considering it as the main reason behind underdevelopment in the Islamic
countries.46 Moreover, the Islamic Movement criticized the movements of the reformists
which took place in the 19th century and called for models of the West, asserting that the Islamic
Movement should not be influenced by these Westernized models.47
The leadership decided to create a secret congress in 1979 which consisted of 60
members and came up with a name for the Islamic Movement to be “The Islamic Group” or
“Jamaa Islamiyya”, and agreed on its fundamental rules.48 These rules asserted that the
congress should witness a new consultant Council every three years, and a novel Executive
Bureau headed by the Movement’s president, along with a novel official of the Movement
regionally.49 The Movement kept on carrying on its work in secrecy until it was unveiled by
the police in 1980. Afterwards, the Movement decided to officially register as a political party,
under the name of “The Islamic Tendency Movement” in 1981.50 The second congress of the
Movement started to have a tendency towards confrontational against the government as it

44

Ibid., 260.

45

Ibid.,

46

Ibid.,

47

Ibid.,

48

Ibid.,

49

Ibid.,

50

Ibid.,
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decided to have a coalition with the opposition parties in an effort to overthrow the Tunisian
regime at that time.51 In 1981, the Tunisian authorities initiated a series of prosecutions, and
the Tunisian Islamic Movement started witnessing a hardship period with the Tunisian
authorities, which was on the other hand having a crisis with the leftists which out the country
into severe problems, which intensified after the parliamentary elections that were falsified by
the government to obstruct the opposing party, the Democratic Socialist Movement, from
having seats in the parliament.52
The Islamic Movement’s political and violent attitude against Bourguiba’s government
was revealed after the attack on Gafsa took place in 1980.53 Gafsa is a poor town located in
south western Tunisia, and famous for its hostility towards Bourguiba.54 Tunisian rebels carried
out the attack and bombed numerous locations including the barracks of the army. The Islamic
Movement held the government accountable for the attack and considered it a result of the
social and political unrest.55 Hence, the Movement took opportunity of these circumstances
and presented itself as the sole available alternative political party. The Movement’s students
wing started taking a more radical action by announcing their support to those who carried out
the Gafsa attack. Since then, the government started considering the Movement of having

51

Ibid.,

52

Ibid., 261.

53

Ibid.; Anne Wolf, "An Islamist ‘renaissance’?”, 563.

54

Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation”, 269.

55

Ibid., 261.; Wolf, "An Islamist ‘renaissance’?”, 563.

Democratization and extremism: The case of Tunisia

Abdelaty 18

hypocritical and contradicting attitude.56 Hence, this reflects that Islamists violence was present
under a regime that was not undergoing political transition, and democratization in specific.
The government started to become more concerned with the attitude and views of the
Tunisian Islamic Movement following the Gafsa violent incident and began to justify the
prosecution of several members and its efforts to curb the spread of the Movement.57 The
authorities had two main reasons to confront the Islamic Movement. The first reason was the
government’s belief that the Movement’s goal was to take power by force. The second reason
was the authorities’ unacceptance of the of the Movement’s involvement in mosques and the
fear of the government from the Movement’s control over the religious institutions.58 107
Islamists got imprisoned for up to 11 years.59 Islamist leaders outside prison started to
reevaluate the Movement’s political and ideological experiences, which resulted in the split of
some figures to create an Islamic group focusing specifically on the ideological side more than
the organizational one, and gave themselves the name of “The Progressive Islamists in
Tunisia”60 Moreover, the reevaluation resulted in the emergence of two opposite trends: a
modest one claiming not to take a violent trend. The moderate trend was headed by Abdelfattah

56

Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation”, 261.; Wolf, "An

Islamist ‘renaissance’?”, 563.
57

Allani, “The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation”, 261.

58

Ibid.,

59

Ibid.,

60

Ibid., 262.
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Mourou, who’s the co-founder of Ennahda Party.61 The second trend is a radical one that
preferred revolting against the authorities and was headed by Salah Karkar.62
Tunisia witnessed a period of relief and desire for inclusion and participation of the
Islamists from 1984 till 1985.63 The “Bread Uprising of January 1984” broke out 1984, as a
violent response to the increase of bread price in the country.64 Muhammed Mzali, the Tunisian
Prime Minister back then, thought that the Minister of Interior along with members of the trade
union initiated the uprising and resulted in the firing of the Minister of Interior and the sentence
of Habib Achour, the secretary general of the union.65 The Prime Minister’s relationships
worsened after these actions that he took, and he had to limit the losses. Thus, Mzali worked
on having a compromise with the Movement’s members who were imprisoned, and started
releasing them progressively.66 The Movement considered Mzali as their ally after he began to
sympathize with their views and managed to protect the Arab and Islamic identity while
preaching modernization.67 Although Bourguiba was not convinced with giving the Islamists
space to participate in the political life, the Prime Minister worked on relieving the tensions
between the President and the Movement.68

61

Ibid.,

62

Ibid.,

63

Ibid.,

64

Ibid.,

65

Ibid.,

66

Ibid.,

67

Ibid.,

68
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The Tunisian security and social conditions deteriorated after the fall of the government
of Mzali in 1986 which resulted in the spread of riots across the country.69 The confrontation
between the authorities and the Movement started taking place again, after Ghannouchi’s
prosecution took place in September 1987, resulting in his life sentence. After Bourguiba
ordered Bin Ali to kill the Islamists in prison including Ghannouchi, Ben Ali refused and
according to Ghannouchi, “Ben Ali not only saved one person but a whole nation”.70 This
reflects the amount of frustration that the President had towards the Islamists and the repression
they suffered from that could explain their violent actions that took place later on. From this
point, the period of confrontation came to an end and a new era of participation started.71 In
November 1987, Zin El Abidine Ben Ali came to power “by means of a constitutional coup
against Bourguiba”, and became the second Tunisian president, which was considered as a
relief for the Tunisian Islamists.72 In summary, Islamism has been used as a tool of opposition
against the authoritarian government throughout the Tunisian history prior to the Arab
Spring.73 The roots and history of Islamist extremism and jihadism in North Africa dates back
to 1992 when the electoral process in Algeria, which was a chance back then for Islamists to
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be in power, was suspended, leading to a dreadful civil war.74 Thus, jihadism in the Islamic
Maghreb had its roots in Algeria from where it expanded in the form al-Qaeda, and continued
to grow in the form of Ansar al-Sharia after the Tunisian revolution’s aftermath.75

Political Islam and violence in Tunisia under Ben Ali’s ruling period
The aim of this section is to show the existence terrorist activities before the introduction of
democracy in Tunisia and under the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali despite explicit repression
towards religiously influenced groups, movements and parties and their involvement within
political affairs of the country as a result of this marginalization. Political Islam has been
deployed by both the state and extremists as a means of altering the status quo, and became
instrumental in security bodies, governmental entities, and social groups.76 Political Islamism
was allowed in Tunisia as a vital means for successful democratic transition.77 According to
John Turner, the Tunisian Islamic parties took part in the political life after the revolution,
reflecting the possibility of democratization.78 Tunisia has been characterized by having
Political Islam as the main opposition force, and the most critical political challenge that
Tunisians have been dealing with since the independence.79 Islamists tend to deploy violence
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to enforce change in society. In Tunisia, Islamism is perceived as “a counterbalance to the
radical left opposition”.80 Ben Ali tried to denounce and bring down the Islamic Movement as
he felt threatened by its power.81 Since the mid-1990s, the Tunisian authorities have been
instigating “a war of words with religious elements”, portraying “conservative Muslims as
Islamists and terrorists”.82 This strategy has succeeded since both terms are used till today in
an interchangeable way in Tunisia.83
Once Ben Ali became Tunisia’s president, the Islamist Movement was excited to
participate in the political life. Ben Ali’s regime repressed public expression related to political
Islam for two decades.84 After the Islamists’ success in the elections that took place in 1989,
Ben Ali started repressing the Movement, which was renamed during the same year as
“Ennahda” in order to comply with the governmental regulation that was issued in 1988 to
prohibit having party names that refer to religion.85 Since then, many members started taking
a more radicalized stance against the authorities.86 For instance, during the year 1991, an office
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related to the Constitutional Democratic Rally in Tunisia’s downtown was burnt by three
Islamists which resulted in the death of a guardian.87 This violent incident was enough to give
the authorities the excuse to repress the Islamists until the fall of Ben Ali’s during the Jasmine
revolution.88 In this regard, violence seemed to dominate the scene in Tunisia while the country
was still not witnessing any political transition.
In 2002, al-Qaeda attacked Tunisia, and Ben Ali’s regime continued to target Ennahda
as a “source of terrorism”.89 With the repression and imprisonment of many members of
Ennahda starting the 1990s, some Islamists took a violent path to express their views by joining
radicalized and extremist groups.90 Such aggressive path was clear in 2006 when five Tunisian
Islamists along with a Mauritanian one had been trained by al-Qaeda and started recruiting
members and carried out violent incidents that caused instability within the country. The police
were able to arrest two of them, while the other four were able to radically and violently attack
vibrant institutions and Tunisian as well as foreign figures.91 Furthermore, the only four
radicalized Islamists were able to create a Jihadi network and recruited around 40 others to join
their group.92 The degree of repression and suppression that Islamists faced hindered them from
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“becoming socialized in the norms of negotiation and compromise”.93 Therefore, as the state
tried to maintain internal stability, its use of repression, in all its forms, , ranging from
imprisonment, state violence, persecution, and torture towards Islamists, intensified feelings of
marginalization and alienation in the hearts of Islamists who resorted to the use of violence and
extremism due to their feelings of alienation from their society.94
Tunisia witnessed an unprecedent flow of Tunisian jihadists in the 2000s, and a lot of
young Tunisians got influenced by the radical extremist ideology.95 The government intensified
its unjustified arrests to a lot of young Tunisians out of fear from strengthening Islamic jihadism
the country.96 This shows that although Tunisia was not witnessing a transition to democracy
at that time, the country still had some of its conservative Muslims joining radical movements
due to their repression, instability, and marginalization.

The Arab Spring in Tunisia: Did it lead to extremism?
This section aims to assess the relation between the drive for democracy through the Arab
Spring and the rise in terrorism, arguing that despite the rise of these terrorist activities after
the Arab Spring in Tunisia, extremists existed way before the Tunisian revolution during the
authoritarian regimes that ruled the country. Therefore, the democratization process that
Tunisia has witnessed and the introduction of democracy by way of the revolution was not the
catalyst to the introduction of terrorist activities within the state, however, it merely just made
them visible.
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In 2011, Tunisians decided to put an end to the oppressive authoritarian rule of Ben Ali
and to bring down his regime. Mohamed Bouazizi, a street vendor, sparked the upheaval when
he set himself on fire publicly in the city of Sidi Bouzaid to demonstrate the haphazard seizure
of his business.97 The Tunisian uprising that started in 2010 reflected the problematic
conditions of youths in most of the Arab states. Tunisians protested against social, economic,
and political conditions reflected in high poverty rates, lack of good educational systems,
expanding unemployment, growing income gaps, political repression, worsening of public
services, and social and political marginalization and neglect.98 Tunisians were able to bring
down Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime in January 2011 after being in power for twenty four
years.99 After sparking the Arab Spring uprisings, Tunisia was able to have a successful
transition to democracy, unlike Syria, Yemen, and Libya that fell into civil wars, and Egypt
that regressed to authoritarianism.100 Tunisians succeeded in having presidential and legislative
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fair and free elections in 2014, drafted a constitution, and formed a new government.101 The
two major political players, secularists and Islamists, approved and supported the new
constitution in January 2014, after a transitional period that was characterized by volatility and
instability between 2011 and 2013.102 After fulfilling these achievements, Tunisia has been
considered as the sole democratizing Arab country after the Arab Spring took place in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria.103 Therefore, after the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, the Tunisian
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political secularists and Islamists were able to prove that society, religion, and politics can
come together under democratic circumstances.104
In 2015, Tunisia was hit hard by major terrorist attacks since its transition to
democracy.105 In March 2015, 22 people were killed in the Bardo Museum by Islamist
attackers.106 During June, another 39 people, mainly tourists, were killed as well by a member
in ISIS at the Imperial Marhaba Hotel in the Tunisian city of Sousse.107 The attacks mainly
targeted touristic places that had symbolic significance in Tunisia with the aim of disturbing
the tourist industry and thus shacking the economic and employment sectors and causing
instability within the country.108 Another terrorist attack took place on November 24th when
many presidential bodyguards were killed by a suicide bomber on a bus.109 Some small-scale
terrorist incidents persisted in 2016 when a Tunisian soldier was murdered by Islamist
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extremists in his home. Also, two police officers were wounded by another Islamist extremist
in November 2017.110After these major terrorist attacks, “skepticism about democracy
increased significantly.”111 In order to assess the impact of terrorism on the Tunisian
population, Andersen and Brym carried out a study to analyze whether the terrorist attached of
2015 encouraged Tunisians toward authoritarianism and pushed them to doubt democratization
as a suitable political system.112 The scholars found out that the 2015 terrorist attacks have had
destructive effect on attitudes towards democracy, even those who strongly supported
democracy “had their faith in democracy shaken” after the terrorist attacks.113
The “dual trends” of intensifying democratization and expanding violent extremism
since the fall of Ben Ali’s regime create a research puzzle.114 Some scholars argue that as
Tunisia has been democratizing, it was expected to witness a decline in extremism and
radicalization.115 Many scholars, including Alan Krueger, argue that violent extremists
originate from countries that oppress civil, social, and political rights.116 According to Arch
Puddington, who’s currently a “Senior Scholar Emeritus at Freedom House”, more than 90
percent of the terrorist attacks that took place in 2013 “occurred in partly or not free
countries”.117 Nevertheless, after Tunisia received the “Free rating” from the Freedom House
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in 2015 for the first time, it has been recorded that almost seven thousand Tunisians have joined
terrorist groups such as ISIS.118 Compared to the whole Tunisian population that is estimated
for eleven million, the anticipated number of Tunisians who joined terrorist groups in 2015 is
relatively large and substantial.119

Islamists’ violence and terrorism in Tunisia
This section aims to analyze the reasons for terrorist activities within the state of Tunisia. It
aims to argue that the democratization process is not the main reason for the rise in terrorism
and the high number of recruits joining terrorist organizations rather there are different
mechanisms by which individuals choose to participate in terrorist activities. First of all, on a
microstate level analysis which focuses on the state itself and the micro level analysis which
focuses on the individuals themselves and the circumstances which influences their choices.
This analysis shows that depending on the position state is in and the circumstances of that
particular individual their choices could differ. Therefore, some could choose to go down the
extremism route and some may choose the secular route or neither. Therefore, democratization
in itself is not the catalyst, rather a combination of the factors surrounding the state and the
circumstances of the person in question.
Among the Arab countries, terrorism has become a real security threat.120 Countries
that witness transition from authoritarianism to democratization are more likely to be
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vulnerable to violence, terrorism, and Islamic Jihadism since they do not have consolidated
normative and institutional democratic foundations.121 Hence, violence and terrorism are
considered as serious threat to democratizing countries due to the sense of insecurity, economic
instability, and social tensions that result from such attacks.122 The Carnegie Middle East
Center conducted a study in which it observed that the Arab youth are not properly ready to
“compete in a globalized society”.123 Moreover, it has been found out by the Middle East Policy
Council that in several Arab states, labor markets do not have the capabilities of providing
sufficient job opportunities in order to be able to withstand their mounting youth populations.124
The Arab Spring uprisings paved the way for contention and political opportunities for
Islamists.125 According to the literature, the Tunisian domestic political consequences led to
the domination of two novel jihadi actors to the scene. On a transnational level, ISIS became
dominant and on a domestic level, Okba Ibn Nefaa became the prominent one.126 In this
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section, I will refer and analyze ISIS since it has gained a lot of attention in the literature not
only for its global expansion in general and in Tunisia in particular, but also for its use of
modern recruitment and mobilization techniques.
Although the development and domination of these violent jihadi groups resulted
mainly from internal political events, the regional situation became as of much importance as
the internal one due to the emerging importance of proclaiming a “global Islamic Caliphate”.127
Hence, Tunisia, as well as other Arab countries, witnessed the emergence of various types of
violent Islamist jihadists after the eruption of the Arab uprisings. Jihadism in Tunisia started
spreading partially due to the confrontation policy that was adopted by the authorities for many
years.128 Mourou perceives the Islamist tendency as being against Arab leaders, the West, and
democracy, and for having the desire to fight “ its enemies by arms rather than politics”.129
Samir Ben Amor, a Tunisian lawyer, once stated in a conversation with an American diplomat
back in 2008, that during Ben Ali’s ruling period, especially after 2004, Tunisian has witnessed
more of its citizens joining jihadism.130
The democratic transition in Tunisia has been threatened by terrorist attacks, economic
instability and political divisions.131 Some scholars argue that the support to jihadism has
significantly increased in the Arab countries due to the political and economic instability that
resulted from the eruption of the Arab Spring uprisings.132 Others argue that Islamic violence
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and Jihadism does not necessarily spate in countries that are politically unstable or from
countries where jihadist movements are spread.133 However, a lot of foreign fighters join
terrorist jihadist groups, because of their different perspectives on “the role of Islamism in
sociopolitical life and the political authority of the regime”.134 Other scholars argue that violent
extremism and recruitment in jihadist groups are expected to decline with the democratization
process.135 However, among the Arab world countries, despite being the sole democratizing
country, Tunisia has been found to generate the greatest number of foreign fighters joining
jihadist groups.136 In July 2015, according to United Nations experts, it has been recorded that
around 5,500 Tunisians have joined ISIS and traveled to fight in Syria. By the end of the year
2015, this figure is estimated to have risen to approximately 6,000 extremist and radicalized
Tunisians.137 Also, according to a study carried out by the Tunisian Center for Research and
Studies on Terrorism, almost 69 percent of the Tunisian jihadists traveled to Lybia for “military
training”.138 Hence, from the perspective of terrorist recruitment, and with the huge flow of
recruits, Tunisia is considered to be the main Arab country responsible for the survival of ISIS
in Syria and Iraq.139 According to the literature, the reasons behind Tunisia being the largest
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generator of foreign fighters in jihadist groups mainly lie in the country’s weak economy, high
levels of unemployment, poverty, as well as the impact of marginalization of youth politically,
socially, and economically.140 However, the literature does not extensively elaborate on the
correlation between the democratic transition of Tunisia and its relation with high flow of
recruits joining terrorist organizations and violent extremism.
The inability of countries to fulfill the expectations and needs of their people might lead
to social and economic grievances.141 The Tunisian case shows that terrorism and violence can
hinder the process of peaceful transition to full democracy.142 The concept of democracy itself
is a contested one. It is crucial to understand that procedural democracy occurs when free and
fair elections are held, and when the political system respects civil and political rights, as well
as freedom is expression. However, the system in itself is not a “true democracy”.143 This type
of democracy, along with material, substantial, or procedural democracy, is crucial, as the
ruling system needs to be able to satisfy its citizens’ needs, including the minorities, and
ensuring equality at all levels. According to Francesco Tamburini, terrorism and violence are
fueled with the absence of material democracy.144
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The Arab States witnessed a number of uprisings in 2011 that led to a period of
political instability. In most of the countries that witnessed the Arab Spring uprisings,
the situation ended with the continuation of authoritarianism or civil wars.145 Islamist
movements have become, as in the past, the main opposition and challenge to the political
systems.146 From 2011 till 2013, the Arab countries that went through the uprisings and
experienced political instability witnessed the rise of novel trend for jihadism as a social
and political force.147 This new trend encourages jihadists to convert into political and
social movements. In Tunisia, this trend is demonstrated in ISIS and Ansar al-Sharia.148
The violent incidents that took place during the post-revolutionary period of volatility
and turmoil from 2011 to 2013 were usually linked to jihadist movements.149 After the
fall of Ben Ali’s regime, Tunisia witnessed two different entwined paths. The first one is
represented in the domination of party politics as per the literature on democratization,
while the other path is represented in the social dispute that took place through “street
politics”.150 The Islamists were actively present in both directions. The secularist bloc
started reacting towards the presence of Islamists in the political life and the radical jihadi
movements on streets as there was as a threat that Islamists could take over power and
society.151 In order to be part of the political sphere, Ennahda party was pressured to
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support technocratic government and give up their power. In the meanwhile, Ansar alSharia and ISIS were declared as terrorist organizations with Ennahda’s approval.152
Violence has been deployed as a political mean of confronting the state after Ansar alSharia (AST) was legally banned.153

Concluding remarks
To sum up, the aim of this chapter was to demonstrate that the transition to democracy does
not necessarily lead to violence, as it has been argued by some scholars like Mansfield and
Snyder. After deploying the process-tracing method to explore the history of Islamists’
violence in Tunisia prior to the Arab Spring and the process of transition to democracy, it has
been found out that violence has already existed and preceded the democratization process in
Tunisia. Also, the rise of Ennahda party during the transitional period to democracy in Tunisia
reflects that influence of the history of repression of Islamists during the authoritarian ruling
periods of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, as well as the other sociopolitical factors.154 After reviewing
the history of the previous Tunisian regimes in relation to Islamists, some could argue that the
deprivation of Islamists from freely expressing their voice and needs and restricting them from
joining the political life could be considered as a reason to explain why some of those Islamists
were pushed to the use of arms and resorted to the use of violence and joined terrorist groups.
However, if this is the case under authoritarian regimes, then why has the number of recruits
in terrorist groups increased after the democratization of Tunisia? This shows that the transition
to democracy is not the core variable to Islamists’ violence or to the insurgence of high rate of
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jihadists from Tunisia. However, there could be other explanations for this phenomenon, which
will be discussed thoroughly in chapter two.
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Chapter 2: Democratization and extremism
Introduction
Despite of the fact that studying the history could be insightful to prove a specific argument,
as what has been proved in Chapter 1, that Tunisia witnessed Islamists’ violence under its
authoritarian regime long before the Arab Spring revolution and the country’s transition to
democracy, it is still not enough. Although process-tracing and historical analysis is essential
to initiate discussion that would be related to the present, it is still crucial to analyze the whole
situation from contemporary studies and incidents as well as from theoretical perspectives
because there could be some limitations to the sole dependency on historical analysis.155 First
of all, when analyzing the history of a country or specific incidents, there could be a tendency
to overstress or assume the continuity over time, and supposing that the present is explained
by the past.156 Second of all, historical analysis might not be able to fully resolve and determine
the theoretical matters that might be posed by such history.157 Also, as argued by John Mahoney
in his article Process Tracing and Historical Explanation, the use of process tracing method in
political science “often lacks systematization of technique and explicitness in execution”.158
Moreover, as further emphasized by James Mahoney, the causality resulting from the processtracing method to a certain case “might be conceptualized in terms of necessity” in the literature
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of social science.159 This means that if “X” is asserted to cause “Y” in a certain case, then this
indicates that “X” was a “necessary condition” for the occurrence of “Y” in this certain case.160
Also, some scholars argue that the use of process tracing may perceive causes as contributing
conditions that can result in increasing the “probability of an outcome”.161 Therefore, this
chapter discusses the factors that possibly push individuals to join violent acts and groups from
a micro-individual level and macro-state level. After carrying out a multi-level analysis, the
chapter will conclude with a meso-level of analysis to answer the thesis’s research puzzle while
resorting to Jon Elster’s mechanisms.
The Arab Spring uprisings brought about a new phase of Islamic violence revival by
forces of globalization which has severely changed social beliefs in the region.162 This change
was mainly characterized by the acceptance of secularism and modernism with all its secular
features.163 This transformation led to the considerable restriction of accepting the interference
of religion in politics and the public sphere.164 In relevance to International Relations, and
according to secularists, religion is in itself separate from the political, economic, and social
domains of the state and governance.165 Therefore, secularism does not entail referring to
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divine orders or holy books in order to dictate and guide the state system, laws and
government.166 Several authors discuss the position of religion in international politics, while
focusing on two prevailing positions. The first of which is that religion is perceived by some
political scientists as “an irrational obstacle to the pursuit of progressive politics”. Whereas the
second of which perceives religion as a “unique and immutable civilizational ‘glue’
contributing to animosity between civilizations”.167 However, when these two secularist
positions towards religion intermingle, this might cause, as argued by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd
in her article The Political Authority of Secularism in International Relations, a disclosure of
political sphere and the “displacement of politics”.168
Hence, the role of Islam has mostly been minimized in the judicial, textual, and public
life.169 Modernism, as well as secularism framed the role of Islam in giving legal and ethical
guidelines for public life issues as well as socio-economic reforms.170 “This current is in the
mainstream of reformist Islam and intervened between two extremes, conservatism and
radicalism”.171 Conservative Islamism endorses the values of authority, hierarchy, family, and
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property, backed up with the preeminence of religion in its acknowledged form, unlike radical
Islamism which aimed to bring down “Infidel Governments” and enforce the Islamic State.172
Hence, political Islam is both a political and religious phenomenon that arose as a result of
development, modernization, and globalization with all their unsettling scopes.173
After the Arab Spring uprisings, the political Islam trend tends to have become more
regressive, provoked by contentious forces of religious extremism and autocracy.174 Some of
the literature on Islamic radicalization and extremism suggest a lot of causes for the
phenomenon ranging from political oppression, vacuum, instability and marginalization, to
economic hardships, poverty, and lack of job opportunities.175 Some scholars argue that the
revival of Islamic extremism and radicalization in the region has been due to the political
instability that Arab countries have witnessed after the Arab Spring uprisings, as well as the
persistence of authoritarian regimes, with the exception of Tunisia as well the emergence of
civil wars in some of the Arab countries and the resurrection of transnational terrorism that is
provoked by “radical Islamism”.176 While some Islamists revert to violence and jihadism,
others decide to be part of the political system and give up some of their goals. In Tunisia,
while some Islamists joined terrorist organizations after the revolution amid the transitional

172

Ibid.,

173

Ibid.,

174

Ibid.,

175

Brynjar Lia, "Jihadism in the Arab World after 2011: Expaining its expansion." Middle East

Policy 23, no. 4 (2016): 74-91, p. 87.
176

Sanjeev Kumar H. M., "ISIS and the Sectarian Political Ontology: Radical Islam,Violent

Jihadism and the Claims for Revival of the Caliphate." India Quarterly (SAGE Publications)
74, no. 2 (2018): 119–137, p. 120.

Democratization and extremism: The case of Tunisia

Abdelaty 41

period to democratization, Ennahda party decided to have a coalition with the secularist
political actors in order to take part in the political process.177 Hence, this chapter aims to
understand the relationship between democratization and Islamists’ violence from a microindividual level and macro-state level while examining the case of Tunisia amid the Arab
Spring. This chapter also aims to analyze the different stance of Islamist actors and understand
Tunisia’s Ennahda Islamic party and its willingness to join secularists and give up many of its
core beliefs in order to be part of the political life and why other individuals decided to join
violent groups.

Tunisia as a battle field for Islamists’ violence and compromise
Tunisia’s Ennahda Islamist Party versus Ansar al-Sharia
After the eruption of the Arab Spring, Tunisia has been a battle field for Islamist’s violence
and compromise. The aim of this section is to compare between two Tunisian Islamist groups,
Ennahda Islamist party and Ansar al-Sharia terrorist group in order to identify the goals of both
and understand their different stance towards the democratization of Tunisia and after the Arab
Spring. In 2011, and after the Arab Spring erupted in Tunisia, the Tunisian people “elected a
National Constituent Assembly (NCA)” that was able to adopt a new constitution in 2014,
despite of the security, economic, and political instability.178 Ennahda party, led by
Ghannouchi, was significant to the Tunisian transition to democracy and claims a substantial
degree of the composition of the new constitution, which seems to contradict the party’s
values.179 The new constitution only mentions Islam as the “state’s religion” and in the
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Preamble which states “our people’s commitment to the teachings of Islam”. Other than that,
there is no much substance referring to Islam or sharia in the new constitution that asserts that
the state is a “civil state based on citizenship, the will of people, and the supremacy of law”.180
Certainly, the approval of Ennahda’s party to the new constitution and matters related
to Islamist ideology and religion has been widely noticed. The party decided to give up
substantial core demands driven by Islamic ideology such as the constitutional reference to
sharia as a source of state’s guidance and law, the description of women’s status in the
constitution, referring to human rights as “universal”, as well as the acceptance of having
presidential-parliamentary system which contradicts the party’s preferred parliamentary
system.181 Ennahda party’s stance could be regarded as a compromise or a tactical decision that
aims to achieve future realization of the party’s ideology. In his discussions regarding the
reason behind the agreement of Ennahda party to give up the sharia clause from the new
constitution, Ghannouchi claims that the drafting of the new constitution aimed to gather wide
agreement in Tunisia. Thus, the aim of Ennahda was not to have a constitution drafted
particularly to satisfy the party’s ideology, but the whole society.182 According to Ghannouchi,
the new constitution shall be adopted based on human values since Ennahda is part of this
humanity that refined some principles like human rights and democratic principles.
Ghannouchi further emphasized that Ennahda party wants to embrace a civil state that depends
on its people, since the legitimacy of a ruler comes through the people and pluralistic, free, and
fair elections.183
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Hence, Ennahda party has mainly drawn their focus based on the moderation
framework, whether implicitly or explicitly, and this could be further explained by their
deviation from the Muslim Brotherhood leading principles “towards a liberal democratic
agenda.”184 Ennahda party’s stance after the Arab Spring and during the democratic transition
in Tunisia could be regarded as a “learning process” that the party has developed after
observing the experiences of other Islamist parties and actors that the region has been through
after the uprisings and revolutions and within a multifaceted, uncertain, fragile domestic and
regional context.185 For instance, on several occasions, Ennahda acknowledged that the ouster
of Egypt’s Former President Mohamed Morsi along with the severe repression of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt has acted as a “wake-up call” since the Tunisian Islamist party pointed
to the weakness of the Islamists’ position in Tunisia and the country’s vulnerable political
transition process.186 Hence, in light of the rising international and domestic terrorism,
Ennahda party recognized the urge to distance itself from associating between violence and
Islam in order to avoid societal rejection. Certainly, the attacks carried out by terrorist
organizations such as ISIS and Ansar al-Sharia increased the fear of “a resurgent Islamist threat
which could nullify the gains of a modernist tradition”.187 Therefore, Ennahda party has been
exerting effort to reassure national and international opinion about its adoption to democratic
values through the party’s “mainstream official discourse” and by adopting key procedures to
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support democratic values.188 Consequently, Ghannouchi completely realized the Tunisian
experience as a pioneering one among the rest of the Arab countries as it is the only
democratizing Arab country “based on religious coexistence”.189 On the other hand, Ansar alSharia Islamist terrorist group decided to adopt violence and carried out several terrorist
attacks. The Tunisian government declared Ansar al-Sharia as a terrorist organization in 2013
as the group had a role in the assassination of eight Tunisian soldiers in the mountains close to
the Algerian borders.190

Democratization and extremism in the terrorism literature
The relationship between democratization and extremism has been widely discussed in the
terrorism literature from different perspectives. Some scholars argue that it is less likely for
terrorists to emerge from democratic countries and that countries that suppress civil and
political rights are more likely to produce extremists.191 Yet, other scholars indicate that
political transition and democratization could produce violent extremists and terrorism and
therefore result in having conflict and instability due to pluralism and marginalization of
minorities.192 According to many scholars, the democratization process can lead to civil war,
internal conflict, and violence.193 For instance, as argued by Michel Wieviorka, the armed
conflict was deadly in the period following the democratic transition in Spain.194 According to
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Quan Li, countries that are experiencing regime changes are vulnerable to terrorist incidents
more than stable regimes.195 According to Bernard Lewis, Islam and democracy are
paradoxical since the Muslim Arab world lack representative governments, civil society, social
pluralism, and individual freedoms.196 Ernest Gellner also contributed to Lewis’s argument as
he claims that secularization has been resisted and not adopted in the Arab Islamic countries
which hinders their transition to democracy and makes the concept of separation between
religion and politics extraneous.197
On the other hand, Alfred Stepan argues in Religion, Democracy, and the Twin
Tolerations that it is misleading to attribute Islam to Arab culture, since this indicates that there
are no Muslims living under democracies because of the Islamic culture which he proofs to be
a wrong assumption as millions of Muslims around the world live under democratic regimes,
but not in the Arab countries.198 According to Stepan’s “twin tolerations”, Tunisia was able to
lead a transition to democracy by adhering to the two tolerations, the first of which is the
toleration of religious people towards the state, which requires their acceptance to the
“democratically elected officials” regardless of their religious claims.199 The second toleration
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is the state’s toleration towards religious citizens, which requires the legal permission of the
latter to freely express their voices and views within the society and to freely participate in the
political life.200 Hence, as argued by Stepan, successful transition to democracy requires not
only the adoption of free, fair, competitive elections, but most importantly, it requires “a clear
functional distinction and a mutual respect” between religious citizens and political authority,
which means that the transition to democracy is not possible without strong political
institutions.201
Whereas a considerable number of scholars defends the argument that democracy
obstacles the emergence of Islamist terrorism and that it mainly stems from authoritarian and
non-democratic structures, a wide body of academic literature, on the other hand, argue that
the democratic system could have some characteristics that could lead to and encourage the
rise of terrorism.202 For instance, some scholars, like Mansfield and Snyder, argue that the
political transition, and democratization in particular, might lead to conflict and violence within
the state.203 As discussed by Mansfield and Snyder in their article “Electing to fight”,
democratization is considered to be the riskiest type of regime change, as it puts democratizing
countries in a more dangerous situation than those witnessing a transition to autocracy, or stable
democracies, or even stable autocratic states.204 Mansfield and Snyder discuss the possibility
of the emergence of war and conflict during the transition to democracy. The authors argue
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that war and conflicts arise during transition to democracy in states that have weak or absent
accountable political institutions, rule of law, competitive political parties, and news media that
is professional and not biased.205 Accordingly, weak states tend to witness interstate conflicts
and violence due to the interests of politicians who want to prevail in elections, perceiving their
opponents as the nation’s enemies, and thus producing extremism and violent tactics from other
actors who feel marginalized and excluded.206 Hence, states with weak regimes and weak
political institutions are more likely to witness terrorist and violent attacks domestically as well
as transnationally.207
Extremism and politics have been addressed by other authors through moderation
hypothesis. Schwedler argues that the inclusion of radical Islamist groups into the political
system and considering them as legitimate political players may result in transforming such
actors into moderate ones.208 Hence, democratic inclusion of radical Islamist groups might limit
the possibility of having violent, armed conflicts and terrorist attacks within the country.
Furthermore, it has been argued that undemocratic regimes could, in some cases, encourage
legitimate political inclusion of Islamists in order to limit the rise of internal opposition.209
Therefore, according to moderation hypothesis, there is a “causal relationship between
inclusion and moderation” which implies that democracy or democratic values that might
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sometimes be adopted even in authoritarian regimes, could decrease the possibility of
extremism and radicalization, and result in moderate Islamist political actors.210 Most of the
literature addressed recruitment in terrorist groups in relation to democratization either from a
macro perspective, focusing on the state and its institutions, or from a micro-level sociological
and psychological perspective, with a dense focus on the motivations pushing individuals to
join terrorist groups. The link between the two levels is however understudied and not clearly
outlined in the literature. Therefore, in this chapter, I aim to analyze the Islamist’s violence
from a micro-individual level and a macro-state level, since mobilization and recruitment in
violent groups must be tackled from a broad, multi-level perspective.211 Hence, I mainly
problematize the argument that democratization could lead to high risk of conflict within the
state, Islamist violence, and terrorism, and I hypothesize that democratization is not a
dangerous form of regime change since in Tunisia, interstate violence that resulted from
Islamist groups had already existed prior to the country’s transition to democracy as indicated
in Chapter one.

A micro-individual level of analysis to explain why individuals join violent groups
As discussed by several scholars, individuals who join violent actions or extremist terrorist
groups tend to be affected largely by the country’s political conditions, weak institutions,
societal marginalization, as well as being sidelined from the political sphere. Moreover, it has
been argued that people tend to get easily recruited in extremist groups in countries which have
high unemployment rates, extreme poverty, and a weak economy. In Tunisia, the reasons
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behind the country being listed as the largest generator of foreign fighters in jihadist groups
amid the Arab Spring revolution mainly lie in the country’s weak economy, high levels of
unemployment, poverty, as well as the impact of marginalization of youth politically, socially,
and economically.212 Moreover societal uncertainty and dislocation encourage displaced
people to be more vulnerable to terrorist groups.213 For instance, In 2012, the economic
indicators in Tunisia had worsened. According to the data available from the National Institute
of Statistics, the unemployment rate in Tunisia has inclined from “13 per cent in 2010 to 17
percent in 2012”.214 Moreover, the inflation rate reached almost 10 percent, which caused the
standard living conditions to deteriorate, leading to almost 2.5 million out of the Tunisia
population of 11 million to live below the poverty line of a $2 per day.215
All these factors negatively affect the individual’s values and interests. In order to
understand the interaction between the political (the state) and non-state actors (violent Islamist
groups), constructivism would be crucial to understand the change in interests and identity of
both state and non-state actors.216 To address this thesis’s research puzzle, constructivism
would explain how the behavior of individuals is based on one’s experiences, norms, ideas,
and identity.217 As indicated in Chapter 1 and after carrying out the process-tracing to the
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history of Islamists’ and Islamists’ violence in Tunisia, Islamists under President Habib
Bourguiba as well as under Ben Ali were subjected to periods of oppression, imprisonment,
political marginalization, repression, and denial from participating in the political life.
Therefore, these long periods of repression and marginalization could be considered as a crucial
variable for the high rates of individuals who joined violent groups and terrorist organizations
amid the Arab Spring revolution and the transition to democracy in Tunisia. Therefore, ISIS,
for example, targets young people by inducing its strong ideology to those who are unsatisfied
with their social, political, economic, and ideological structures.218
There has been a great focus on the analysis of terrorists’ recruitment, mobilization,
and radicalization after the development of ISIS. Although radicalization could be part of
recruitment process, the majority of scholars fail to distinguish between both activities.219
Whereas Brizka argues that cognitive radicalization is the process that results in the acceptance
of an individual to the radical and extremist movement’s ideology and beliefs and giving it
outward support, but the process does not always result in commitment of the individual to
carrying out terrorist act in support of the extremist ideology. On the other hand, Mitts
counterargues this argument by perceiving radicalization as the process that takes place over
time, in which the individual becomes progressively committed to violent and extreme views
and ideologies. Recruitment is considered as a dynamic process by which an individual is
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persuaded and encouraged to join a terrorist group, whether willingly or unwilling.220 Some
scholars argue that cognitive radicalization is the process that results in the acceptance of an
individual to the radical and extremist movement’s ideology and beliefs and giving it utmost
support. However, the process does not always result in commitment of the individual to carry
out terrorist violent acts in support of the extremist ideology.221 Other scholars, whom I adopt
their perception towards radicalization, define radicalization as the process that takes place
over time, in which the individual becomes progressively committed to violent and extreme
views and ideologies.222
It is crucial to understand not only the structural characteristics of recruitment and
radicalization process, but also the individual’s cognitive understanding and construction of
novel definitions of behavior and self that make them vulnerable for falling preys to jihadism
and terrorist groups.223 The transformative learning theory is an interdisciplinary approach that
provides “a practical framework for understanding how change occurs in individuals”.224 This
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theory was developed in the 1990s by Jack Mezirow and it combines elements of
constructivism and cognitivism, which is crucial to understanding the psychological change
that happens to individuals in the case of radicalization and recruitment in violent groups.225
According to Mezirow theory, learning is the process by which one uses previous
interpretations to construct a novel one which guides the person’s experience toward future
behavior and actions. This approach encompasses five core concepts. The first one is the
meaning schemes which refers to the particular feelings, judgments, attitudes, and beliefs that
determine the individual’s perceptions and meanings, and are observed in one’s “behavior and
verbal interaction”.226 This approach could easily be reflected in one’s feelings of being
marginalized, oppressed, poor, socially alienated. The second concept revolves around the
perspectives of meaning, which is built on meaning schemes, and exists within the individual,
shaping the new experiences and filtering the person’s perceptions. In this case, the person
might start perceiving the state and society as an enemy due to the negative feelings and
personal conditions that is facing him or her. The third concept is about distortions, which refer
to the perceptions that are no longer fitting the current reality of an individual. At this stage,
the person is expected to be in a phase of quest to personal significance. The fourth concept is
critical reflection; which is the capability of reflecting critically on those distortions, and is
triggered by crisis that causes disorienting dilemmas such as conflict, personal loss,
marginalization, and instability. In the case study of this thesis, the crisis that might have
triggered high numbers of individuals to join violent Islamists’ groups and actions is the
revolution and transitional period to democracy. The last concept is the process of
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transformation which becomes reflected in the personal evolution or change that can be gradual
or sudden, and this could explain the final decision to individuals who could transform from
normal to extremists and violent citizens or members of terrorist groups.
Consequently, personal change that occurs to an individual is a product of these
cognitive and mental concepts and transformation processes. Hence, this helps in shaping our
understanding of the change in an individual’s behavior depending on the conflict, political
instability, economic, and societal circumstances as well as the push and pull factors affecting
people’s perception towards violent acts.227 Constructivism, along with the transformative
learning theory will then help in explaining the change in behavior, identity, ideas, and beliefs
that occur as a result of political and non-political factors. Individuals get influenced and tend
to join violent actions against the state for several risk factors which include grievance, which
is in most cases caused due to societal injustice.228
However, not every individual who faces injustice or any kind of difficulties is willing
to resort to violent acts. Consequently, the study of political psychology is important in order
to analyze the individual traits, which further complicates the study of recruitment and
mobilization in Islamists’ violent groups.229 For the purpose of this thesis, I aim to touch upon
the factors pushing individuals to join violent actions and groups and not to deeply analyze the
issue from a psychological perspective. ISIS, for instance, claims to be fighting for a divine
goal which is to create a Caliphate and rule the world using the Islamic teachings according to
the group’s own wrong interpretations. However, those who join the group usually tend to be
mobilized by personal psychological and socio-economic factors such as to earn high salaries,
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or to become a hero.230 Therefore, this implies that recruiters of violent groups have to be
almost psychologists to have the ability and capability of exploiting human needs which are
exemplified in the search and need for esteem, achievement and meaning. According to some
political psychologists such as Arie Kruglanski, those who join violent or terrorist groups are
usually in search for “personal significance” which is therefore triggered by the loss of selfesteem.231 On the other hand, some scholars argue that political, economic, and
sociopsychological explanations of Islamist terrorism are insufficient because they do not
explicate “why ubiquitous grievances and structural strains” provoke terrorists in some cases
and not in others.232
Hence, recruiters in violent groups tend to mobilize individuals who are marginalized,
whether politically, socially, or economically or have been personally humiliated by the state,
and convince them that by joining the group and pursuing its mission, their search for personal
significance will be fulfilled.233 Therefore, applying Mezirow’s theoretical approach to the
micro-individual level analysis would explain why some individuals tend to change their
norms, values, and behaviors based on their feelings, experiences and tend to be more
vulnerable to violent actions. Referring back to the example of ISIS, it has been observed that
most of the individuals who join the terrorist organization are usually oppressed, maltreated
and not protected by their governments. Hence, ISIS tend to promise those who feel disgraced
and humiliated to restore their honor if they fight against the government. ISIS has further
bluntly referred to its followers in the twelfth issue of its online magazine, Dabiq, as “the
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brothers who have refused to live a life of humiliation”.234 Furthermore, ISIS offers high
salaries and therefore it attracts individuals with hard economic circumstances.235
Therefore, several scholars focused not only on the socio-economic and political factors
pushing individuals to extremism but also on the psychological factors that motivate young
people to join Islamists’ violent groups, like ISIS. Some articles published in France 24 and
TRT World highlighting the background of a Tunisian terrorist who killed three people in a
church in Nice, France. According to the articles published on the terrorist, Brahim Aouissaoui
is a 21-year-old Tunisian national and an immigrant, who has been charged with murder of
three people in the French city of Nice on 29th of October 2020. Aouissaoui grew up in the
city of Sfax in Tunisia after moving there from the governorate of Kairouan in the early 2000s.
In September 2020, Aouissaoui moved to Europe from Tunisia first by crossing the
Mediterranean to Italy and then to France. Growing up, Aouissaoui was not typically religious,
as a matter of fact like a lot of young men his age he smoked marijuana, drank alcohol and
partied alongside his friends in his home town. However, in 2019 he quit drinking and smoking
and started praying. Despite that, he remained as social as how he used to be and continued to
hang out with his friends and going to the gym. Friends and family did not find his behavior as
alarming at all, as this was typical for all men his age to start taking the right path. However,
Aouissaoui had to drop out of school to support his family, which could somehow explain his
tendency and appeal towards joining terrorist groups that offer high salaries and promise better
living conditions. He ended up learning motorcycle repairing and also sold contraband fuel for
living which was illegal in Tunisia, although authorities choose to turn a blind eye towards
these illegal activities as it could lead to social unrest. During his time in Tunisia, he was
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making a living profit of $20 to $25 a day which is considered a good amount of money in
Tunisia. Despite his upbringing, officials have no evidence linking him to extremism while in
Tunisia.236 Therefore, it is speculated that he might have been radicalized during his time in
Italy. From the biography of Aouissaoui, it is clear that the was not satisfied with his living
conditions, whether the social or the economic ones.
One another case was for a video published in March 2015 by ISIS, in which a Tunisian
terrorist called Abu Yahya al-Tounessi, called on Tunisians to join ISIS and he aimed to deliver
a threatening message to the government of Tunisia as he recorded: ““We are coming to
conquer back Tunisia. I swear you will not be at ease now with the Islamic State a few
kilometers from you just across the border.” Relatedly, in April 2015, the “Tripoli Province”,
an ISIS-affiliated group, published a video showing a masked gunman who promised to wage
attacks to take revenge for Islamists jailed in Tunisia, stating: “The Islamic State is only a few
kilometers from you [Tunisia], we are coming.” The video also called on Tunisians to come to
Libya to fight with ISIS: “Brothers, come to Libya. Don’t be humiliated by the [Tunisian]
dictators. Muslims have their own state now”.237 Hence, socio-economic factors along with
state extensive repression and oppression are often perceived as key factors and explanations
for Islamist terrorism and violence. Violent incidents carried out by extremists and terrorist
groups are often explained by the factors of alienation and marginalization, as well as the tough
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socio-economic conditions that many Middle Eastern societies suffer from.238 Although the
previous examples can support the many arguments in the literature which claim that the socialeconomic circumstances as well as the displacement and migration could act as core factors
pushing individuals to join terrorist groups, however, it is still not valid to generalize this
argument, since not all those living in poverty and hard social circumstances tend to radicalize
and join terrorist acts. From the above previous examples, it is obvious that repression,
imprisonment, and the state’s use of violence and silencing Islamists back under the
authoritarian regimes of Ben Ali and Bourguiba could have led to the present situation and the
expansion of the base of recruits joining terrorist groups. Nevertheless, this explanation or
prediction is inadequate, since other Islamists did not take the same violent extremist path and
chose to come together with the secularist government of Tunisia after the Arab Spring and be
part of the political sphere.

Macro-state level analysis
After analyzing the reasons that push individuals to join Islamist terrorist organizations and
violent groups from a micro-individual level perspective, it is crucial to analyze the issue from
a macro-state level perspective in order to examine how the state’s institutions and transition
to democracy affect the rate of individuals joining violent groups. As discussed by several
authors, democratization is not the optimum means of fighting Islamist violence. On the
contrary, the rule of the majority can result in more violence, as minorities would still be
marginalized.239 As argued by several scholars in the literature, democracy may not only fail
to hinder the rise of terrorist groups or movements, but it can encourage it for a couple of
reasons. One of the reasons discussed in the literature is that the open nature of democratic
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countries unintentionally allows for a welcoming environment for terrorism.240 Countries with
democratic characteristics allows for freedom of movement, assembly, and information, which
might allow for the organization and formation of terrorist movements and extremists and give
them the capability of remaining undetectable for long time. Some scholars, like Leonard
Weinberg and William Eubank, argue that there is a positive relationship between terrorism
and democracy, as they explain statistically that terrorist attacks take place in the most stable
democracies of the world, and that both perpetrators and victims of such terrorist incidents are
citizens who belong to stable democratic states.241
Other scholars argue that semi-democratic or semi-authoritarian regimes are subjected
to utmost risk of suffering from violent attacks and terrorism.242 Hence, democratic states are
sometimes perceived to be more likely to provide safe havens for terrorist groups and
extremists to organize and carry out violent attacks and to form support networks.243 These
terrorist groups then could target authoritarian regimes from which they have been ejected or
democratic ones with policies they strongly reject.
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As discussed by Paul Wilkinson,

terrorists are desperate citizens who represent a significant “excluded minority whose
preference have lost out or are no longer seriously considered in the normal democratic struggle
over the formation of public policy”.245 This happens because the democratic regime might
turn into a “tyranny of the majority”, which thus allows terrorism to emerge under democratic
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systems where the voting of the majority is conceived as a systematic whipping of the minority
and their desires.246
Violent extremist groups tend to thrive and mobilize large number of recruits in
countries that suffer from poor and weak governance.247 As discussed by many scholars
including Mansfield and Snyder, whom I problematize their argument, the transition to
democracy might result in war and interstate conflicts and violence which arise in states that
have weak or absent accountable political institutions, lack rule of law, have no competitive
political parties, and news media that is unprofessional and biased.248 Barbara Geddes also
argues that poor economic performance, economic hardships or any other crisis that causes
instability within the state could drive normal individuals into violent opposition. Hence,
societal and economic changes could affect individuals’ behaviors as well and result in strong
violent opposition while weakening the elites.249 Relating these arguments to the case of
Tunisia, the Arab Spring has barely improved the social and economic circumstances in the
marginalized areas of the Tunisian “economically underdeveloped southern border regions”
which are perceived as “hotbeds for social unrest”.250 The unemployment rates in the country
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range between 22 and 30 per cent, along with few job opportunities offered to the youth, and
scarce private and public investments.251
Moreover, in the case of Tunisia, despite of being the sole Arab Spring country that has
succeeded in witnessing a transition to democracy after being ruled by autocratic regimes for
many decades, the country still recorded the highest number of recruits joining terrorist groups
after the Arab Spring. The country still has not achieved a consolidated democracy and has
been facing the impending risk of backsliding towards authoritarian inclinations.252 Since then,
the Tunisian government’s fight against terrorism and extremists has led to the divergence of
huge amounts of the country’s budget from fighting hunger, poverty, economic instability, and
unemployment.253 The Western partners and donors have supported the Tunisian government’s
fight against extremism since it has corresponded with their security interests. Moreover, as
the refugee crisis dominated the scene in 2015 and the number of Islamist terrorists increased
globally, Western partners such as the United Stated and the European Union increased their
technical support and military aid given to Tunisia for better border management and
surveillance.254 Hence, as argued by Cengiz Günay and Fabian Sommavilla, the fight against
terrorism in the young democracy of Tunisia might act as a risk factor for reviving authoritarian
patterns with the focus on hard security, and could lead to the deterioration of the social and
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economic situation of marginalized groups and leading Tunisia to a “grey zone” between
democracy and authoritarianism”.255
On the other hand, it is crucial to shed light on the relationship between Islamist
terrorism and authoritarianism. Some scholars argue that authoritarian regimes are less likely
to be subjected to terrorism.256 This argument lies on the belief that authoritarian regimes may
seem to be well placed to avoid transnational and domestic terrorist attacks within their borders
by arbitrarily suppressing the opposition and controlling armed activities on a domestic level.
However, they can still disseminate the problem by sponsoring terrorists abroad, since
repression of terrorist groups may lead to their transformation to transnational terrorist
organizations, leading to terrorist attacks abroad.257 Equally, within authoritarian regimes,
political liberalization can lessen the spillover effect of terrorism as it can permit the
deportation of opposition groups abroad and supports the channeling of armed protests and
campaigns “against national institutions into peaceful activities”.258
Hence, some scholars support the view that democratic characteristics and systems
can encourage terrorism rather than curb its existence. For instance, Katerina Dalacoura argues
in her book “Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East” that “democracy is not a
certain antidote to terrorism”, and hence democracy, in many cases, does not necessarily hinder
the emergence and spread of terrorist organizations.259 For example, in the post-World War II
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era, Western Europe, where the most mature democracies are established, experienced the rise
of a broad variety of terrorist groups and violent movements.260 Some of these terrorist
movements, whether ethno-nationalist movements or ideological extreme leftist movements,
have plagued the politics of Western Europe ever since. These movements encompass the
Italian Red Brigades established around the 1970s, the Greek 17 Group that was founded
between 1873 ad 1975, as well as the Baader Meinhof (German Red Army Faction) which
commenced its operations during the 1970s.261 Moreover, according to the World Terrorism
Index that was published by the London-based World Markets Research Center, North Korea
has been classified as the country that is “least exposed to international terrorism”.262
However, although the former examples might indicate that terrorism was widespread
in democratic European countries, this does not reflect that there exsits a direct casual
relationship between demcoracy and terrorism. Based on statistical data and evidence, and
according to the annual report of the US State Department’s ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism’,
countries classified by the Freedom House as “free” witnessed 269 major terrorist attacks
between the years 2000 and 2003, where as “partly free” countries experienced 119 terrorist
incidents, and “not free” countries faced 138 attacks by terrorist movements.263 Therefore,
these statistical evidence implies that there is no clear relationship between the occurrence of
terrorist incident in a country and the level of freedom enjoyed by its people.
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Chapter 3: Explaining the relationship between democratization, Islamist’
violence and compromise using mechanistic approach
Meso-level analysis while resorting to the approach of mechanisms
As explained earlier, in Tunisia, while some Islamists joined terrorist organizations after the
revolution and amid the transitional period to democracy, Ennahda party decided to have a
coalition with the secularist political actors in order to take part in the political process.264
Tunisia’s leading Islamist party, Ennahda, decided to give up many of its religious platform’s
planks in order to be part of the political game and joined secularists in a governing coalition
that perceived Ansar al-Sharia as a terrorist organization.265 As explained by Kalyvas in
“Commitment Problems in Emerging Democracies: The Case of Religious Parties”,
democratization paves the way for opposition and marginalized actors to be part of the political
process and to take part in the fair, free, and competitive elections.266 The situation and future
of secular parties and liberal institutions are put into question once religious parties become
ready to win elections under democratizing states.267 Religious parties tend to either enforce
“theocratic authoritarian institutions” or let go of their objectives and adjust themselves to be
part of the emerging democratic political system, which reflects what Tunisia’s Ennahda party
went through after the Arab Spring.268 The outcome is certain in the first case as
democratization does not certainly succeed. However, in the second case, uncertainty prevails
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as democratization might succeed but it might also fail. In the case of Tunisia, the country is
still an emerging democracy.269
In order to understand the different stances of Islamists of Ennahda party versus others
who joined violent and terrorist organizations or groups amid the Arab Spring revolution and
during the democratization process in Tunisia, I will resort to Jon Elster’s mechanistic
explanation. According to Elster’s definition, mechanisms are regularly occurring patterns that
could be recognized easily and are driven by unidentified conditions or undetermined
consequences.270 Mechanisms give us the opportunity not to predict or assume “objective,
knowledge-independent indeterminacy”, but to explain behaviors and consequences that are
undefined compared to what we know.271 Elster portrays mechanisms in a way that makes them
rely on our “epistemic condition” and relate to the “social scientist’s worldview” that is
relatively ignorant.272 According to Elster, mechanisms tend to be “explanatory in their own
right”.273 As explained by Elster, mechanisms can be divided into two general kinds. The first
kind of mechanisms are triggered under undetermined consequences, whereas the second kind
of mechanisms have uncertain consequences.274 Therefore, the first type of mechanisms is
mainly about triggering and it revolves around what takes place “at the beginning of a causal

269

Ibid.,

270

Johannes Persson, "Mechanistic Explanation in Social Contexts: Elster and the Problem of

Local Scientific Growth." Social Epistemology 26, no. 1 (2012): 105-114, p. 106.
271

Ibid.,

272

Ibid.,

273

Ibid.,

274

Ibid.,

Democratization and extremism: The case of Tunisia

Abdelaty 65

chain”. For instance, as Elster explains, if the predator is detected by the prey, this might lead
to the escaping of the predator, but sometimes, the prey disregards the predator.
The second type of mechanisms has to do with the indeterminacy of the overall effects
or results, as it is mainly concerned with the “end of the evolving casual pattern”275 For
instance, as Elster elaborates, practice probably improve the swimming skill and the confidence
in the skill of swimming for all swimmers. The swimmer’s risk exposure might be affected by
both skills. Sometimes, the swimmer’s skill might increase the risks, but definitely it does not
increase the risk of drowning.276 Hence, two causal chains seem to be activated by the training:
on one hand, swimming skill seems to reduce the risk of drowning, while on the other hand,
this risk might increase with confidence. In some cases, confidence in the skill of swimming
rises faster than the swimming skill itself. Therefore, the overall effect of training on risk is
usually indeterminate.277 Hence, according to Elster’s argument, once the triggering condition
is identified, the mechanistic explanation is lost and replaced by a law.278
Relating Elster’s mechanistic explanation to the case of Tunisia, Elster’s mechanisms
could explain the different stances that Tunisia has witnessed from its Islamists, whether those
who resorted to violence and joined terrorist groups or the country’s major Islamist party that
decided to compromise many of its principles in order to be part of the political game. After
the Arab Spring revolution in Tunisia, the process was gravelly. Despite all the crises and
instability that the country went through after the revolution, and after the political actors
succeeded to reach a point of compromise and have a new constitution on the 26th of January
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2014, Tunisia was able to pave its way to democratization.279 However, the process of
democratization in Tunisia carried in its way two different mechanisms regarding its Islamists:
a violent one and a compromising relatively peaceful one. On one hand, amid its transition to
democracy, Tunisia has been found to generate the greatest number of foreign fighters joining
jihadist groups.280 On the other hand, the large Tunisian Islamist party, Ennahda, has decided
to have a coalition with the secularists, and supported the new constitution although it
encompassed several principles that were previously opposed by Ennahda.281
For instance, the new constitution declares that “Tunisia is a civil state”, which reflects
the unacceptance of the interference of religious corpus in the state.282 Also, this constitution
that has been backed up, accepted, and supported by the Tunisian Islamist party, Ennahda, does
not refer to Islamic law but only to the “teachings of Islam”, which reflects the effective
exclusion of any Islamic legal role within the state.283 Moreover, the newly approved
constitution declares the “right to freedom of conscience and belief”, which is a principle that
is highly controversial in the Muslim world.284 This principle is highly contested among
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Islamists as it admits that each citizen has the right to freely choose their faith; to change their
religious affiliation, or freely abandon any religious belief. In the Muslim world and among
most traditional Islamic establishments & Islamist ideologues, the idea of a Muslim
abandoning Islam is strictly condemned. Therefore, the new constitution contradicts Ennahda’s
Islamist principles and ideology.285 However, it has still been accepted by the Islamist party
despite its democratic and liberal laws that deviate from Islamic law or Sharia’a. At the same
time, the upsurge of Ennahda party and their acceptance to be part of the democratization
process and accept it could be explained by the long periods of the party’s marginalization and
repression under Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime.286 Therefore, this indicates that, according to
Elster’s mechanistic explanation, democratization could lead to two mechanisms: the first of
which is conservative Islamists supporting democratic values that they used to oppose back
then, and the second of which is that non-conservatives could become violent, join extremist
terrorist groups, and have the will to kill noncombatants, although it is prohibited by all divine
religions.287 Hence, democratization does not lead to violence and interstate conflict.

Conclusion
The “dual trends” of intensifying democratization and expanding violent extremism since the
fall of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia creates a research puzzle.288 Some scholars argue that as
Tunisia has been democratizing, it was expected to witness a declination in extremism and
radicalization.289 Others argued that democratization is not the optimum means of fighting
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Islamist violence, as the rule of the majority in itself can result in more violence, as minorities
would still be marginalized.290 In this thesis, I aimed to hypothesize that democratization does
not lead to Islamists’ violence, and that there could be other explanations for any violence that
might arise after a revolution and during the transition to democracy. After reviewing the
literature on democratization, terrorism, and Islamists’ violence, I found out that many scholars
focused on the analysis of the micro-individual level, which means the factors that push
individuals to join violent groups that affiliates itself to Islam. These factors include political
instability, poverty and deteriorating economic circumstances, social and political
marginalization. After analyzing the literature from a micro-individual level perspective, it has
been found out that individuals tend to join violent groups and actions amid a revolution, and
not necessarily during a transition to democracy, due to the feelings of marginalization,
alienation, grievances, and personal humiliation that they might have accumulated during
periods of oppression from their government and society. Also, as argued by Barbara Geddes,
economic hardships or any other crisis that cause instability within the state could drive normal
individuals into violent opposition. Hence, societal and economic changes could affect
individuals’ behaviors as well and result in strong violent opposition while weakening the
elites.291 As discussed in the literature, some individuals are willing to kill non-combatants
and participate in violent acts against the state in order to gain money and improve their
economic and living conditions. These factors tend to affect the political psychology and
ideology of some individuals and push them towards extremism and violent acts.
On the other hand, some scholars focus on the macro-state level analysis in order to
understand why some individuals resort to violence and join terrorist groups in democratizing
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countries. Some scholars argue that violence is more likely to erupt in democratizing countries
with weak institutions. Others argue that the process of the transition to democracy itself results
in violence and interstate clashes and conflicts. Therefore, after a thorough review to the
literature and the secondary data sources on democratization and Islamists’ violence while
resorting to the process-tracing method to analyze the history of Islamists’ in Tunisia, I came
up with a meso-level analysis that could help in explaining the research puzzle using Jon
Elster’s mechanisms. This analysis results in having two main mechanisms related to
democratization. The first one is that democratization, or political transition in general, could
lead to the rise of violence due to weak and unstable institutions, even more than authoritarian
regimes.292 The second one is that democratization could result in having political actors who
are influenced by divine principles and ideas supporting the transition to democracy and giving
up some of their ideological principles in order to be part of the political sphere. While resorting
to the use of a single-case study, Tunisia represents a battle ground for these competing
mechanisms and poses an empirical puzzle. Tunisia is considered as the sole Arab country that
has been democratizing since the Arab Spring, while at the same time the country has witnessed
two different stances from its Islamist actors. The meso-level analysis would then be as
follows: democratization could lead to two mechanisms: the first of which is conservative
Islamists supporting democratic values that they used to oppose back then, and the second of
which is that non-conservatives could become violent and join extremist terrorist groups. The
meso-level analysis is an intermediate explanation that combines both the micro-individual
analysis and the macro-state level analysis of the thesis’s research puzzle. The reason why I
deploy Elster’s mechanistic approach in this thesis is because mechanisms give us the
opportunity not to predict or assume “objective, knowledge-independent indeterminacy”, but
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to explain behaviors and consequences that are undefined compared to what we know.293
Hence, when there is another autocratic country that is undergoing a transition to democracy,
it will be possible to apply Elster’s mechanistic approach as exemplified in the case study of
Tunisia. Also, we can conclude that not all Islamists’ are violent. Although the process-tracing
of the history of Islamists’ in Tunisia reflects that there were some violent incidents carried out
by the Tunisian Islamist Movement, Ennahda party did not resort to violence during the
democratization process after the Jasmine revolution, because the goals of the party might be
different from those of terrorist groups. Ennahda party does not seem to aim at imposing
Islamic Sharia’ law or to have a secular state, but it might be aiming to have a secular society
instead, unlike Islamist terrorist groups like ISIS and Ansar al-Sharia who fight for creating an
Islamic Caliphate guided by the Islamic Sharia’ rules and laws, and to completely abandon
secularism. 294 Therefore, after critically analyzing the case of Tunisia and the literature on
democratization, Islamism, and extremism from multi-level analysis perspectives, Therefore, I
conclude that democratization is not the crucial variable to violence and interstate conflict.
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